Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

David Pugh v. North American Warranty Services
Inc : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert W. Hughes; Mark P. Cohen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Kendall S. Peterson; Peterson Reed; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, No. 981712 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1873

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Kendall S. Peterson (Bar No. 4389)
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-4040
Facsimile (801) 364-4060
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID PUGH
Plaintiff/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Vs.
NORTH AMERICAN WARRANTY
SERVICES, INC.,

Appellate Case No. 981712-CA
Priority Classification 15

Defendant/Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON AUGUST 21, 1998 BY THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER

Robert W.Hughes #1573
Plaza I At the Sports Mall
5505 South 900 East #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 263-0569
Mark P. Cohen
2901 Butterfield Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60523
Telephone: (630) 990-7787
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

Kendall S. Peterson #4389
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-4040
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 1 3 19S9
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

Kendall S. Peterson (Bar No. 4389)
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-404i»
!• .,'.: ! T nle! 801) 364-41 i/-. .••

IN THE UTAH COURT i >1 \PPL:Ai .i

DAVID PUGH
Plaintiff/Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Vs.

NORTH AMERICAN WARRANTY
SERVICES \\r

Appellate Case No. 98171. Priority Classifican-- ' c

\

Defendant/Appellant

APPEAL FROM i HE J L L X J M E N T ENTERED ON A L G L S i i l , 1998 BY THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE ROBERT K HILDER

Robert W.Hughes #1573
Plaza I At the Sports Mall
5505 South 900 East #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 263-0569
Mark P. Cohen
2901 Butterfield Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60523
Telephone: (630) 990-7787
Attorneys iui i^iendant/Appellant

Kendall S. Peterson #4389
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
321 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-4040
\l!onu.\ lor PLiuililf Appdk'.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A.
Cases
B.
Statutes and Rules
C.
Other Authorities

iv
v
v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature, Proceeding and Disposition Below

3
3

B.

Statement of Facts

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED
PUGH ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON NORTH
AMERICAN'S BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT
OF GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
WAS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY PLEADING,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND EVIDENCE

III.

4
8

9

15

A. Pugh Sufficiently Pleaded Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith Performance

15

B. The Trial Court Entered Adequate Findings of
North American's Breach of the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

18

C. North American's Obligation to Repair Pugh's
Vehicle Was Not "Fairly Debatable"

20

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PUGH
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF
THE USE OF HIS VEHICLE
A. Pugh Was Not Required to Tear Down or Repair
His Vehicle in Order to Mitigate His Damages

24

24

B. Sufficient Evidence Was Before the Trial Court to
Support the Award to Pugh of the Loss of the Use
of His Vehicle
IV.

V.

27

NORTH AMERICAN CANNOT CHALLENGE THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT
PROVIDING A TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE

24

PUGH SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL AS WELL AS AT
TRIAL

30

CONCLUSION

31

ADDENDUM
A.
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l-301(40)
B.
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1-301(44)
C.
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1-301(56)
D.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-l etseq
E.
Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
F.
Judgment (August 8, 1998)

33
35
36
37
38
48
49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alta Industries. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993)

2

Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744. 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

29

Ashton v. Ashton. 733 p.2d 147. 150 (Utah 1987)

30

Barnes v. Lopez. 544 P.2d 694. 698 (Arizona App. 1976)

25

Billings v. Union Banker's Insurance Co.. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996)
Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Company. 701 P.2dat 801(Utah 1985)

2, 11,21,22
11, 12, 15, 17,19,21,25

Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d414(Utah 1989)
Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Company. 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1997)
Collier v. Hines. 827 P.2d 982. 984 (Utah App. 1992)

30
11,17
11, 17,28
16

General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp..
545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976)

18

Gibbs M. Smith. Inc.. v. U.S. Fidelity. 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997)

11

Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

30

Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. (Utah App. 1997)

10,21

Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990)

18,28

John Call Engineering v. Manti Citv. 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

25

Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion. 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1998)

18

Management Services v. Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406 (UtahCt. App. 1980)

30

Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514. 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

30

Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 p.2d 602. 604 n.l (Utah App. 1993)

15

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 935 (Utah 1994)

1,29

Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 131 (Utah Ct App. 1992)

29

Utah Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

31

Zion's First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance. 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988)... 11
STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-103(3)(j)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40)

3,11,12

Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1-301(44)

14

Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l-301(56)

14

Utah Code Ann. §31A-6A-101

9,10,13,14

Utah Code Ann. §6A-102(6)

13

Utah Code Ann. §31 A-6a-104

14

Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civ. P

16,17

Rule 1 le Utah Rules App. P

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

31
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Blacks Law Dictionary 712 (5th ed. 1979)

12

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a~3(2)(j), the appeal having been transferred from the Utah Supreme
Court on April 13, 1999.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Was the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Pugh appropriate?
A.

Was North American's contract with Pugh a contract of insurance which
would support an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages?

1. Standard of Review. This issue raises a challenge to a Conclusion of Law
entered by the Trial Court and is therefore reviewed under a "correctness"
standard. State v. Pena 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
2. Preservation of Issue. There is no indication in the record that this
issue was preserved on appeal.
B.

Was breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance sufficiently
pleaded, tried by consent or supported by findings of fact?

1. Standard of Review, Questions of law are reviewed for "correctness" without deference to
the Trial Court's decision. State v. Pena, supra.
2. Preservation of Issue. There is no indication in the record that this issue was preserved on
appeal.
C.

Was North American's obligation on Pugh's transmission claim "fairly
debatable"?
1. Standard of Review. Conclusion of law are generally reviewed for
correctness. However, some deference will be granted to the trial

court's conclusion. Billings v. Union Banker's Ins. Co. 918 P.2d 461,
464 (Utah 1996).
2. Preservation of Issue. The record contains no indication that North
American raised the "fairly debatable" defense at the trial level or
otherwise preserved it on appeal.
II.

Was the Trial Court's award of damages to Pugh for the loss of use of his vehicle
appropriate?
A.

Did Pugh take reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages?
1. Standard of Review. Questionof law reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena, supra.
2. Preservation of Issue. Although the Trial Court did issue a
Conclusion of Law concerning mitigation of damages, there is no
evidence in the record that North American objected to that conclusion
or otherwise preserved it on appeal.

B.

Did Pugh submit sufficient evidence at trial or are the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact sufficiently supported by the evidence?
1. Standard of Review. Sufficiency of evidence or findings of fact are
reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. Alta Industries Limited v.
Hurst 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
2. Preservation on Appeal. The record contains no indication that this
issue was preserved on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes are determinative of issues or portion thereof addressed in the
respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statutes is presented in its entirety in the
Appendix.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Rule

Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40)
Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(44)
Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(56)
Code Ann. § 31A-6a-l et seq.
15(b) Utah Rules of Civ. P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The case before the court is, by nature, a contract dispute between David Pugh,

Plaintiff Appellee (hereinafter "Pugh") and North American Warranty Services, Inc.,
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter "North American"). The disputes surround a claim
which Pugh made on a Vehicle Service Contract which he had purchased from North
American for repair or replacement of the transmission in his car. Following a brief
examination of the vehicle, North American declined to repair or replace the
transmission. Pugh filed this action with the Third District Court approximately 60 days
after his claim had been denied, alleging that North American had breached its
obligations under the contract to evaluate and pay the claim. Six months after the claim
was submitted, the transmission was torn down and North American acknowledged that it
needed to be repaired. Finally, North American authorized and paid for repair of the
transmission approximately 12 months after receiving the claim.
The case was tried, without a jury, to the Honorable Robert K. Hilder of the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The evidence submitted to the

Trial Court consisted of a Statement of Stipulated Facts including Exhibits A through J
(included as Addendum 3 to Appellant's Brief), the Affidavit of Kenneth Riddle, which
was submitted pursuant to stipulation of the parties (R-86A, 86B, 86C), and the live
testimony of Pugh. Counsel for Pugh also submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Re: Fees
and Costs on the date of trial (R-123-144). The Trial Court took the matter under
advisement and thereafter drafted and entered its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (Included as Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief) approximately one month
following trial. A judgment in conformity with the Trial Court's findings and
conclusions was entered on August 21, 1998 (R-165, 166, Included as Addendum F to
this Brief).
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On November 16, 1995, Pugh purchased a used 1990 Ford Thunderbird

from St. George Motors. Stipulated Fact No. 1 (R-52).
2.

At the time Pugh purchased the vehicle, he also purchase a Vehicle

Service Contract form North American which covered the vehicle for two years or 24,000
miles, which ever occurred first. Stipulated Facts No.'s 3, 6 (R-52-53).
3.

On May 26, 1997, Pugh experienced transmission trouble between St.

George and Cedar City, Utah, and was towed to Parkway Motors in Cedar City, Utah
with approximately 5 miles remaining under the Vehicle Service Contract. Stipulated
Facts No.'s 19, 20 and 21 (R-55).
4.

The Vehicle Service Contract provides that if a loss occurs within a

warranty period and within the allowable mileage that North American "will either
provide such repair or replacement (plus labor) himself, or reimburse an authorized repair
facility to do so". Findings of Fact No. 3 (R-146).
5.

Pugh reported the transmission breakdown to North American within 24

hours. Stipulated Fact No. 24 (R-55).
6.

Parkway Motors' mechanics removed the transmission pan and discovered

metal shavings or filings in the pan, discolored transmission fluid that smelled burnt and
evidence that the transmission fluid had leaked out of the rear housing seal. Stipulated
Fact No. 25 (R-55).
7.

On May 30, 1997, North American's agent Ken Riddle went to Parkway

Motors to inspect the vehicle. Parkway Motors mechanics informed Riddle of the metal
flecks in the pan, the transmission fluid which smelled burnt and the leaksfromthe
exterior housing seal, which facts Mr. Riddle included in his initial report to North
American. Stipulated Facts No.'s 27, 28 (R-56).
8.

Pursuant to his instructions received from North American, Ken Riddle

instructed Parkway Motors' mechanics to reinstall the transmission pan and fill the
transmission with new oil. Whereupon, he test drove the vehicle for approximately 11
miles, noting that the transmission shifted roughly into overdrive. Stipulated Facts No.'s
26, 27, 28 (R-55-56).
9.

North American unreasonably limited the scoped of the investigation of

Pugh's transmission problem by instructing Riddle, who is not a qualified mechanic, to
only test-drive the vehicle. Findings of Fact 7 No. (R-146-147).
10.

The method of inspection of the transmission selected by North American

was contrary to the standard practice which is to tear the transmission down and visually
inspect it. In 12 years as an insurance claims adjuster, Ken Riddle had never been
instructed to attempt to ascertain the condition of a transmission by simply driving it.
Affidavit of Ken Riddle | 5 (R-86B).
11.

On the basis of Mr. Riddle's investigation, North American authorized

only the replacement of the rear transmission seal. Findings of Fact No. 8 (R-147).
12.

Counsel for Pugh wrote to North American on June 11, 1997, and

informed them that neither Pugh nor Parkway Motors mechanics, both of whom had
expertise in transmission repair, believed that the proposed repairs were adequate. In the
same letter Pugh demanded that North American repair or replace the transmission.
Findings of Fact No.'s 7, 9, 10 (R-146-147).
13.

North American refused to further inspect or repair the vehicle, which

remained at Parkway Motors in Cedar City, Utah, until November 24, 1997, when the
parties entered into an "Interim Agreement" to tear down and inspect the transmission.
Stipulated Fact No. 32 (R-56).
14.

The Interim Agreement provided that Pugh and North American would

share the cost of the tear down unless it was determined that the transmission was broken
or defective, in which case North American agreed to pay the entire cost of the tear down.
Stipulated Fact No. 33 (R-56).
15.

On or about November 26, 1997, Parkway Motors tore down Pugh's

transmission. Ken Riddle who inspected the torn down transmission, concluded that the
transmission was defective or broken and that replacement was necessary. Findings of
Fact No. 12 (R-147).

16.

On or about January 15, 1998, North American, through its general

counsel, authorized Parkway Motors to repair Pugh's transmission on the condition that
Pugh pay for the repairs pending reimbursement from North American. The procedure
outlined by North American's counsel is contrary to the Vehicle Service Contract which
provides that North American will pay the repair facility directly. Findings of Fact No.'s
3, 13 (R-146-147).
17.

Pugh, who the Trial Court found lacked the financial ability to pay for the

repair costs, gave Parkway Motors his authorization to perform the repairs but only if
North American accepted responsibility to pay the bill. Findings of Fact No.'s 14, 15 (R148).
18.

Not until April 22, 1998, did North American agree to pay Parkway

Motors for the repair costs. North American forwarded its check for the repair amount to
Pugh. North American withheld one-half of the tear down costs from the check or
$165.00 which it had previously agreed to pay under the Interim Agreement. Findings of
Fact No. 17(R-148).
19.

North American delayed unreasonably in both investigating the loss and in

authorizing and paying for covered repairs when the need was established. Then
Defendant authorized repairs, but refused to follow the payment procedure required by
the contract and finally, when Defendant proffered payment (almost 11 months after the
loss), it deducted sums without justification and in direct contravention of the Interim
Agreement. Findings of Fact No. 22 (R-149).
20.

Pugh, despite having the use of a company vehicle, drove the 1990 Ford

Thunderbird approximately 24,000 miles during the 18 months preceding the
transmission breakdown. Pugh used the vehicle for general transportation on a daily
basis with the exception of three months out of the year when he drove his pick-up which
is equipped for snow removal. Findings of Fact No.'s 16, 24 (R-149).
21.

Pugh was required to continue to make loan payments on his vehicle

during the entire time it was disabled and there is no evidence that he realized any
compensating savings as a result of the delay in repair. Findings of Fact No. 28 (R-150).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In virtually every point of the argument, Pugh contends that North American failed to
preserve the issue on appeal or, in the alternative, North American's failure to include the trial
transcript as a portion of the record, deprives this Court of the ability to determine if the issue
was preserved on appeal or to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, North
American's failure to designate the trial transcript as part of the record, by definition, makes it
impossible for North American to marshal the evidence to successfully contest any of the Trial
Court's Findings of Fact.
Point I.

North American's Vehicle Service Contract is a contract of insurance in

the context of an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages.
Point II.

a.

Pugh's Complaint sufficiently sets forth a claim for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith performance or, in the alternative, breach of the implied
covenant was tried by consent pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P.
b.

Given the facts found by the Trial Court, North American's

obligation to repair or replace Pugh's transmission was not fairly debatable.
Point III,

a.

Pugh's duty to mitigate his damages did not require him to tear

down the transmission in order to prove to North American that it was defective.
b.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact amply support the Trial Court's

award to Pugh for loss of use of his vehicle.

Point IV.

North American cannot challenge the sufficiency of the Findings of Fact

without a trial transcript.
Point V.

To the extent that Pugh prevails on appeal, he should be entitled to recover

attorney's fees on appeal.

o

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED PUGH
ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON NORTH AMERICANS BREACH
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
PERFORMANCE.

North American argues that the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as
consequential damages was erroneous because its Vehicle Service Contract1 is not a
contract of insurance. Although North American fails to note it, the argument
specifically challenges the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 11 (R 152) which, in
pertinent part, provides, "the warranty contract at issue is an insurance contract for
purposes of an award of attorney's fees...". Accordingly, the appropriate standard of
review for the challenged conclusion of law would be one of correctness. State v. Pena,
supra.
The issue which North American requests this Court to review on appeal is found
nowhere in the record. While Pugh clearly requests an award of attorney's fees as
consequential damages for North American's failure to honor its obligations (Complaint
116 R-1C, ID), North American's Answer (R-6-10) fails to allege that consequential
damages are unavailable because its Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of
insurance. Likewise, Defendant's Trial Memorandum (R-87-113) is wholly devoid of
any argument that the service contract is not a contract of insurance. Any argument that
might have been made at trial is not before this court because North American elected not
to obtain a transcript of the proceedings before the Trial Court. See Rule 11(e)(1)
Certificate (R-173).

1

The terminology "Vehicle Service Contract" refers only to the title North Amencan itself selected for its
contract and in no way identifies the instrument as a "service contract" as the same is defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-6a-101 etseq

Q

Because North American has not preserved the issue on appeal, this Court has not
been afforded an opportunity to rule whether North American's Vehicle Service Contract
is a contract of insurance or not. In 1997, this Court clearly and concisely set forth the
requisites of preserving an issue on appeal in Hart v. Salt Lake County Com 'n, 945 P. 2d
125 (Utah Ct.App. 1997):
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue
before the trial court.. ..Second, the issue must be specifically raised such
that the issue is sufficiently raised to a "level of consciousness" before the
trial court.. ..Third, the party must introduce to the trial court "supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its argument.
Hart at 130 (citations omitted). In the present case, the record is devoid of anything
which would indicate that the requisites of preserving the issue were satisfied. Therefore,
this Court lacks any capacity to review the issue presented by North American.
Assuming, arguendo, that North American somehow preserved the issue on
appeal, North American's assertion that its Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of
insurance is based on conclusory and faulty reasoning. North American's argument is as
follows:
Premise one: North American's Vehicle Service Contract is a "service
contract" under the statutory definition set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§31A-6a-101 etseq.\
Premise two: Service contracts are exempt from the Utah Insurance Code;
Conclusion: North America's Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of
insurance.
North American's first premise is conclusory and erroneous as described below.
However,.the larger defect in North American's argument is that the conclusion does not

logically follow even if the premises are accepted. Exemption of a contract from the
insurance code does not eliminate it as a contract of insurance. Rather, it means only that
the contract and its provider are not subject to the regulatory scheme set forth in the
insurance code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-103(3)(j) does not imply that service contracts
are not contracts of insurance; rather, it provides that "this title does not apply
to.. .service contract".
The controlling issue is not whether North American's contract is exempt from
the Utah Insurance Code; but, whether it is an insurance contract under the line of cases
in which Utah court's have allowed recovery of attorney's fees as consequential
damages . The Trial Court clearly understood the context within which it determined if
North American's Service Contract was a contract of insurance "[T]he warranty contract
at issue is an insurance contract for the purposes of an award of attorney's fees."
Conclusion of Law No. 11 (R-152)(Emphasis added).
Unfortunately, neither Beck v. Farmer's, supra, nor any of its progeny have
specifically defined a "contract of insurance" for the purpose of assessing attorney's fees
as a consequential damage. However, relevant and authoritative sources demonstrate that
North American's Service Contract is a contract of insurance for the purpose of awarding
attorney's fees. North American cites the Utah Insurance Code definition of insurance as

2

Beck v Farmer's Insurance Company, 701 P 2d 795 (Utah 1985), Zion 's First National Bank v National
American Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988); Canyon Country Store v Bracey, 781 P 2d 414 (Utah
1989); Billings v Union Banker's Insurance Company, 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996); Castillo v Atlanta
Casualty, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); and Gibbs M Smith, Inc v US Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337
(Utah 1997).

"[A]ny arrangement, contract or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more
persons to one or more other persons...." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40). At page 12
of Appellant's Brief, North America implicitly acknowledges that that definition would
encompass its Vehicle Service Contract. North American cannot, in good faith, claim
that its contract does not transfer the risk of damage or mechanical failure of Pugh's car
to North American. Black's Law Dictionary gives a more generic definition of
insurance:
An agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay money or
its equivalent or to do an act valuable to other party upon destruction, loss or
injury of something in which other party has an interest.
Black's Law Dictionary 712 (5th ed. 1979). Under its Vehicle Service Contract, North
American, in exchange for Pugh's premium, promised to repair Pugh's vehicle in the
event of a loss. Accordingly, the Vehicle Service Contract had all of the characteristics
of insurance.
While Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Company and its progeny do not specifically
define a contract of insurance, the case law does set forth policy reasons why
consequential damages under insurance contracts should be treated differently than they
are in other contracts:
[A] broad range of recoverable damages is conceivable, particularly given
the unique nature and purpose of an insurance contract. An insured
frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available
within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss; damages for
losses well in excess of the policy limit such as for home or business may
therefore be foreseeable and provable
Beck at 802. Those same policy considerations adhere in the contract between North
American and Pugh. Because North American refused to cover the damages within a
reasonable time, Pugh who had limited funds, was left without a way to effect the repairs.

See Finding of Fact No. 14 (R-148). As a result, Pugh faced the harsh consequence of
being without his vehicle for over a year, which gave rise to foreseeable and provable
consequential damages for loss of use of the vehicle and for attorney's fees which he
incurred in pursuing North American. Not only does North American's Service Contract
meet the normal and commonsensical definitions of an insurance contract, but the
relationship between North American and Pugh is that of insurer and insured. That
relationship gives rise to the precise policy considerations which Utah courts have
addressed in granting attorney's fees as consequential damages in Beck and its progeny.
Even if this Court concludes that contracts must be governed by the Utah
Insurance Code to give rise to an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages,
Pugh is entitled to recover the same under his contract with North American. Under the
statutory scheme set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-101 et seq., North American's
contract with Pugh is a "mechanical breakdown insurance" policy rather than a "service
contract". The statutory distinction between a service contract and a mechanical
breakdown contract is not in the coverage of the policy. Both contracts provide
essentially the same coverage. However, mechanical breakdown insurance is issued
directly by an insurance company that is subject to the provisions of the insurance code.
Whereas, a service contract need not be written by an insurance company so long as it is
underwritten by "reimbursement insurance" which is issued by an insurance company
subject to the regulation of the Utah Insurance Code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-102(6).
In order to be issued in Utah, a service contract must contain the following
statements:
"Obligations of the provider under this service contract are guaranteed
under a service contract reimbursement contract insurance policy" (Utah

Code Ann. § 31 A-6a-104(2)).
"Coverage afforded into this contract is not guaranteed by the property and
casualty guarantee association" (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-105(l 1)).
Because North American's Vehicle Service Contract (R-163-164) contains neither
of the required disclosures, it is clear that the contract cannot be a service contract. The
only possible alternative is that North American's contract is a mechanical breakdown
policy which is subject to the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. Accordingly, North
American's Vehicle Service Contract would be a contract of insurance even under the
restrictive definition which is advanced in Appellant's Brief.
On a collateral note, "Insurance business" is defined under the Utah Insurance
Code to include, "(d).. ..providing the characteristics services of Motor Clubs as outlined
in Subsection (56)." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(44). Motor Clubs are defined under
the Utah Insurance Code as providing, among other things, trip reimbursement, towing
services and emergency road services. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(56). North
American's contract with Pugh included emergency travel reimbursement, towing and
24-hour roadside assistance. All of the foregoing are characteristic of Motor Clubs and
included within the coverage of the Utah Insurance Code. Accordingly, even if North
American's contract was found to meet the statutory definition of a service contract, the
inclusion of services characteristic of Motor Clubs would bring the contract within the
application of the insurance code and North American's own restrictive definition of an
insurance contract.
The Trial Court drew a specific conclusion that North American's Vehicle
Service Contract was a contract of insurance for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees
as consequential damages. Based on the record before the Court, North American failed

to preserve that issue on appeal. Regardless of whether North American's Vehicle
Service Contract falls under the regulatory scheme of the Utah Insurance Code, it is
essentially a contract of insurance which is subject to the unique policy considerations of
insurance which were set forth in Beck v. Farmer ys Insurance Company, supra..
Accordingly, there is no reason to disturb the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that North
American's policy represented a contract of insurance. And therefore the Trial Court's
award of attorney's fees to Pugh as consequential damages should be upheld.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
WAS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY PLEADING,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND EVIDENCE.

A. Pugh Sufficiently Pleaded Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
Performance.
North American raises, for the first time on appeal, the argument that the Trial
Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith performance is error because it was not properly pleaded.
Because North American failed to raise this issue before the trial court, it is deemed
waived. "Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed waived,
precluding the [Appellate Court] from considering their merits on appeal." Ohline Corp.
v. Granite Mill 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
While the Complaint does not set forth a separately identified cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance, it does set forth sufficient facts
and elements to fairly apprise North American of Pugh's claim. Paragraphs 13, 14 and
15 of the Complaint set forth the operative facts of a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith performance. (R-1C). Paragraph 13 alleges North American's

refusal to repair the vehicle despite the fact the policy was in effect and the repairs were
covered by the terms of the policy. Paragraph 14 alleges North American's failure to
diligently investigate the claim to determine whether it was valid or not. Paragraph 15
alleges Pugh's loss of use of his vehicle as a consequence of North American's failure to
repair the vehicle.
Notably, Pugh alleges that he has suffered consequential damages for the loss of
the use of the vehicle and for the attorney's fees which he had incurred in pursuing the
claim in paragraph 16 of the Complaint (R-1C, ID). The claim for consequential
damages is carried forward in paragraph 21 of the First Cause of Action as well as in the
Prayer for Relief. The law in Utah was well established at the time the Complaint was
filed on July 25, 1997, that attorney's fees could be awarded as consequential damages in
a first party contract of insurance only upon the insurance company's breach of the
implied covenant to perform its insurance contracts in good faith. Collier v. Heinz, 827
P2.d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, the tell-tale requests for attorney's
fees as consequential damages gave North American fair warning that Pugh had
incorporated a breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance into his
Complaint.
Even if this Court determines that the breach of implied covenant of good faith
performance theory was not adequately pleaded by Pugh in his Complaint, it was
nonetheless appropriate for the Trial Court to consider evidence submitted on that theory
and grant recovery thereon because the issue was tried by consent. Rule 15(b) of the
Utah R. Civ. P. specifically allows the trial court to consider and rule on issues not
presented in the pleadings if they are tried by express or implied consent of the parties.

(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues....
Rule 15(b) Utah R. Civ. P.. In Plaintiffs Trial Brief (R-l 16-118) Pugh
specifically pointed out that his breach of contract claim encompassed a claim for North
American's breach of the implied covenant to perform in good faith. Citing the standards
set forth in Beck, Canyon Country Store, and Castillo, Pugh continued in his Trial Brief
to explain the availability of attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Prior to trial, the parties entered into a Statement of Stipulated Facts. (R-52-86).
North American stipulated to the admission of facts addressing the diligence and
adequacy of North American's inspection of the vehicle. Statement of Stipulated Facts fflf
27-29 (R-56). Further, North American stipulated to the introduction of facts relating to
North American's protracted refusal to repair the vehicle or further examine it to
determine the validity of the claim. Statement of Stipulated Factsfflf30-35 (R-57).
Finally, North American stipulated to the admission of facts concerning its refusal to pay
for the repairs of the vehicle for several months even after it acknowledged the
transmission needed to be replaced. Statement of Stipulated Facts 1fl[ 36-39 (R-57).
North American's stipulation to facts which logically pertain to Pugh's claim for
breach of implied covenant of good faith performance constitutes express consent to try
that issue. At a minimum, North American impliedly consented to try the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith performance by failing to object to testimony thereon

given by Pugh at trial and by failing to object to the introduction of the Affidavit of
Attorney Re Fees and Costs. (R-123-144). "A party may give implied consent when it
does not object to the introduction of evidence at trial." General Insurance Company of
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) and Keller v.
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1998).
Pugh cannot substantiate the absence of objection at trial other than by
recollection because no trial transcript was requested by North American. However,
Pugh should in nowise be prejudiced by North American's failure to request pertinent
portions of the transcript. Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
in pertinent part:
[T]he appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such
parts of a proceeding not already on file as the appellant deems necessary...
neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
Utah R. App. P. 11(e). The Utah Supreme Court, in Horton v Gem State Mutual of Utah,
19A P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), stated that the appellant has the burden of providing
an adequate record to preserve each of its arguments for review. Horton at 849 (citations
omitted). Based on North American's failure to obtain a transcript, it cannot now sustain
the claim that breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance was not properly
before the Trial Court either by express or implied consent.
B. The Trial Court Entered Adequate Findings of North American's Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance.
In a single sentence, which is unsupported by citation to the record or any legal
authority, North American makes the bold assertion that the Trial Court made no findings
that North American had violated its duty of good faith performance and therefore the

award of attorney's fees was improper. (Appellant's Brief page 16). To determine
whether the court made any findings related to North American's breach of an obligation
of good faith performance, it is first necessary to state the standard:
[T]he implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the
very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it
to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and
will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
Beck at 801. Given that standard or definition of goof faith performance, the Findings of
Fact drafted by the Trial Court are replete with findings supporting North American's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance. No less than eight of the
Findings of Fact drafted by the Trial Court address good faith performance:
f7.

Following the breakdown on May 26, 1997, Defendant instructed its agent
Ken Riddle to perform a visual inspection and test drive on May 30, 1997.
The inspection was timely, but Mr. Riddle is not a qualified mechanic and
Defendant unreasonably limited the scope of the investigation. This was
done despite the fact that both Plaintiff and the repair facility, both of
whom possess expertise in transmission repair, opined that the
transmission must be repaired or replaced (R-146, 147). (Failure to
diligently investigate the facts and fairly evaluate the claim).

If 11.

Defendant refused further repair until and Interim Agreement was
negotiated between the parties on November 24, 1997, whereby the parties
agreed to share the cost of a transmission tear down by Parkway Motors.
The agreement provided that if the inspection determined the transmission
was broken or defective, Defendant would pay the entire cost of the tear
down (R-147). {Failure to diligently investigate the facts and to act
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim).

f 12.

On or about January 15, 1998, Defendant, through its general counsel,
authorized the repair, but counsel instructed to Parkway Motors that
Plaintiff would have to pay for the repairs himself and Defendant would
reimburse him (R-147). {Failure to act promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling a claim).

^16.

Not until April 22, 1998, did Defendant agree with Plaintiff and Parkway
Motors to pay the repair costs (R-148). (Failure to act promptly and
reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim).

117.

On May 1, 1998, Plaintiff received Defendant's check in the amount of
$2,467.47, in partial settlement of the transmission repair. The check was
$225.00 less than the repair estimate, because Defendant withheld the
agreed reimbursement for a Plaintiffs share of tear down costs ($165.00
and $60.00 freight charges for part needed to complete repairs.) (R-148).
(Failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim).

1J20.

There was substantial evidence that the transmission needed to be replaced
from the first inspection by Defendant's agent, Ken Riddle, which
occurred on or about May 30, 1997, but Defendant refused to either accept
the evidence or pursue additional investigation, at its expense, which
investigation would have resolved the question (R-148, 149). {Failure to
diligently investigate the facts, failure to fairly evaluate the claim and
failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim).

f21.

Defendant delayed unreasonably in both investigating the loss and in
authorizing and paying for covered repairs when the need was established.
The delay resulted in part from Defendant's concern that Plaintiff may
have somehow manipulated the claim to defraud the company, but the
court finds absolutely no evidence of any such conduct or intent on
Plaintiffs part (R-149). (Failure to diligently investigate the facts and
failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim).

f22.

Even after the repair need was established to the satisfaction of both
Parkway Motors, and Ken Riddle, Defendant's own agent, and no
evidence of fraud was adduced, Defendant first delayed in authorizing the
repairs, then Defendant authorized repairs but refused to follow the
payment procedure required by the contract and, finally, when Defendant
proffered payment, almost eleven months after the loss), it deducted sums
without justification and in direct contravention of the Interim Agreement
(R-149). (Failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling
the claim).

The Findings of Fact prepared by the Trial Court more than adequately set forth North
American's breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance.
C. North American's Obligation to Repair Pugh's Vehicle Was Not "Fairly
Debatable."
On Page 17 of Appellant's Brief, North American raises for the first time the
purported defense that its obligation to cover Pugh's claim was "fairly debatable,"
Again, the record is devoid of any evidence that North American raised the issue in a

timely fashion, that it was raised to a "level of consciousness" before the Trial Court or
that North American ever submitted any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority
concerning the defense. Therefore, based on Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission,
supra, North American has failed to preserve the issue on appeal depriving this Court of
the capacity to review it.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that North American somehow preserved the
issue for appeal, the facts in the record belie the defense, rather than support it. North
American cites Billings v. Union Banker's Ins, Co., supra, for the proposition that an
insurer's wrongful denial of coverage is a question of law" to be reviewed for
correctness. North American misstates the standard of review set forth in Billings. In
headnote 2 of the text of the Billings decision, the Utah Supreme Court commences its
analysis indicating that the interpretation afforded to a prior judicial decision by trial
court is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for correctness. Billings at 464. After
first answering the inquiry as to whether Beck v. Farmer }s Insurance established a "fairly
debatable defense", the court indicated that the trial court's actual determination whether
coverage was fairly debatable or not is subject to a standard of review somewhat less
stringent than correctness.
Whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable under a given set of facts, is
also a question of law... However because of the complexity and variety
of the facts upon which the fairly debatable determination depends, the legal
standard under which this determination is made conveys some discretion
to trial judges... Therefore, although we will carefully review a trial court's
conclusion that an insured's claim is or is not fairly debatable, we will grant
the trial court's conclusion some deference.
Billings at 464 (citations omitted).
The Conclusions of Law drafted by the Trial Court, do not address the fairly

debatable defense, which is evidence that the issue was not raised before the Trial Court.
However, the Trial Court did definitively find that North American breached its
contractual good faith performance obligation. Conclusion of Law 2 provides:
2.

Defendant's breaches included failure to investigate the extent of damage,
failure to promptly authorize and pay for repairs in the manner provided
for in the contract, both before and after the teardown, failure to honor the
Interim Agreement regarding tear down costs and repair when the extent
of damage was ascertained, and failure to follow contract procedures when
responsibility was ultimately accepted.

Conclusion of Law of No. 2. (R 150). The unequivocal finding that North American
breached the implied covenant of good faith performance is antithetical of and excludes a
determination that Pugh's claim was fairly debatable.
North American invites this Court to overturn the Trial Court's conclusion on an
incorrect standard of review based on several incomplete or partial facts. Under the
standard of review set forth in Billings, this Court must grant some deference to the Trial
Court's conclusion that North American breached its contractual obligation of good faith
performance because of the fact-intensive nature of that determination. The partial facts
cited by North American do not justify disturbing the conclusion of the Trial Court when
viewed in light of the totality of facts and circumstances which were presented to the
Trial Court.
North American cites the fact that it had paid previous claims under the Vehicle
Service Contract with Mr. Pugh. While laudable, payment of prior claims has no bearing
on whether North American's coverage of this claim was fairly debatable. North
American cites a portion of Finding of Fact No. 7 which states that Ken Riddle's
inspection of the car was timely. The remainder of the Finding, which North American
neglected to include, recites that Mr. Riddle was not a qualified mechanic and that North

American unreasonably limited the scope of its investigation. Further, the Trial Court
found that North American elected to perform the limited investigation (test driving the
vehicle for 11 miles) despite evidence that the transmission needed to be repaired or
replaced which was received from mechanics at Parkway Motors and Pugh who had
expertise in transmission repair. Finding of Fact No. 7 (R-146-147).
North American recites that during the test-drive the only thing that Mr. Riddle
noticed was that the vehicle shifted hard into overdrive. North American omits that in
Riddle's report prepared for North American, he stated that the transmission pan had
metal flecks in it, that the transmission fluid smelled burnt, and that there were leaks from
the exterior housing seal. Stipulated Fact No. 28 (R-56). North American omits that in
Mr. Riddle's Affidavit, which was admitted into evidence pursuant to paragraph 43 of the
Statement of Stipulated Facts (R-58), Riddle states that in 12 years in the adjusting field,
he had never been instructed to attempt to ascertain the condition of the transmission by
simply driving it and that the standard practice in the industry is to tear the transmission
down and visually inspect it. Affidavit of Ken Riddle Paragraph 4 and 5 (R-86B).
Furthermore, North American omits the sworn statement of Mr. Riddle that North
American did not ask for his opinion; they asked him to report on how the vehicle drove
and any transmission problems noted during the test drive. Affidavit of Ken Riddle
Paragraph 10 (R-86C). Finally, North American omitted the finding of the Trial Court
that "[T]here was substantial evidence that the transmission needed to be replaced from
the first inspection by Defendant's agent Ken Riddle which occurred on or about May 30,
1997, but Defendant refused to either accept the evidence or pursue additional

investigation at its expense, which investigation would have resolved the question."
Finding of Fact No. 20 (R-148-149).
Given the totality of the facts and circumstances before the Trial Court, its
conclusion that North American had breached it contractual obligation of good faith
performance, which must be accorded some deference by this Court, is overwhelmingly
supported by uncontested facts in the case. Accordingly, the fairly debatable defense, if
it indeed was preserved at the trial level, is unsupported under the facts of the present
case.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PUGH
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF USE
OF HIS VEHICLE.

A. Pugh Was Not Required to Tear Down or Repair His Vehicle in Order to Mitigate His
Damages.
North American argues that Pugh should not have been awarded the loss of use of his
vehicle as a consequential damage of North American's own breach of its implied
obligation of good faith performance because he allegedly failed to mitigate his damages.
After North American inspected the car by test driving it for 11 miles and refused to
perform any repair other than replacement of a rear transmission seal, North American
claims that Pugh should have torn the transmission down, at his own expense, in order to
prove to North American that the transmission was bad and needed to be replaced. North
American claims that it had no authority to request diagnostic tests and that tearing down
the transmission was the "providence and responsibility" of Pugh. (Appellant's Brief
page 18).

To comply with a duty to mitigate damages, Pugh need not take any and all
possible actions to diminish or minimize his own damages. The appropriate standard
under Utah law is that Pugh take reasonable actions to mitigate his damages.
In order to submit the issue of mitigation to the jury, there must be competent
evidence to show that the Plaintiff failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate his
damages John Call Engineering v. Manti City 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
citing Barnes v. Lopez 544 P.2d 694, 698 (Arizona App. 1976). (Emphasis
added).
It remains, therefore, to determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, it would
have been reasonable to require Pugh to undertake the actions postulated by North
American.
If Pugh were required to tear down his transmission or perform diagnostic tests
thereon to satisfy a duty to mitigate damages, the duty of good faith performance would
be eliminated. The rationale for the adoption of the implied obligation of good faith
performance was the peculiar relationship which exists between insurers and insured and
the relative powerlessness of the latter in the context of claim settlements.
An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked
disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for that loss. Failure
to accept a proper settlement, although less than fair, can lead to catastrophic
consequence for an insured who, as a direct consequence of the loss, may be
peculiarly vulnerable, both economically and emotionally.
Beck at 798. The insurer's good faith performance obligations to diligently investigate
the facts to enable it to determine validity of a claim, the duty to fairly evaluate the claim
and after act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the same were intended to
secure the benefit of what the insured had bargained and paid for. Under these
circumstances, it would not be reasonable to allow North American to escape the implied

obligation of good faith performance by transferring those obligations to Pugh under the
guise of mitigation of damages.
The determination whether the Vehicle Service Contract covered repair or
replacement of Pugh's transmission ultimately had to be made by North American.
Requiring Pugh to accept the financial burden of making that determination and requiring
him, in effect, to prove coverage under the Vehicle Service Contract is patently
unreasonable. North American's flat refusal to sufficiently investigate Pugh's claim to
determine whether it was valid or not cannot be condoned by then requiring Pugh to
perform North American's obligation under the rubric of mitigating damages. If nothing
else, that would shift the economic burden of making the coverage determination to Pugh
despite the Court's finding that he lacked the financial ability to pay for repair costs.
Finding of Fact No. 14 (R-148).
Even if Pugh were financially able to pay for the cost of tearing down the
transmission or other diagnostic tests, such action would have jeopardized his claim
under the terms of the Vehicle Service Contract. Under exclusion number 5 to the
Vehicle Service Contract, any "alteration, tampering, disconnection, improper
adjustments or repairs" would result in an exclusion of coverage. The contract is replete
with conditions that exclude coverage for repairs not authorized in advance.
THE ADMINISTRATOR MUST BE CONTACTED PRIOR TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF ANY REPAIR. THE ADMINISTRATOR WILL NOT BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY REPAIRS THAT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO
THE REPAIR FACILITY (R-1I).
ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED TO THE COVERED VEHICLE NOT
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY US VIA AN AUTHORIZATION
NUMBER ARE NOT COVERED (R-1I).

PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH REPAIRS, ENSURE THAT THE ISSUING
DEALER OR AUTHORIZED FACILITY CALLS THE ADMINISTRATOR OR
OBTAINS AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WITH THE REPAIR (R-l J).
IMPORTANT: PURCHASER ASSUMES ALL LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT
OF REPAIRS THAT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO THE REPAIR FACILITY
(R-1J).
THE ADMINISTRATOR RESERVES THE RIGHT TO INSPECT THE
COVERED VEHICLE PRIOR TO THE PERFORMANCE OF REPAIR OR
REPLACEMENT (R-lJ).
The terms of the Vehicle Service Contract make it clear that Pugh could not have had the
transmission removed from the car, torn down, or subjected to diagnostic tests without
jeopardizing his coverage under the Vehicle Service Contract. Under those
circumstances it is clearly unreasonable to have required Pugh to tear down the
transmission or attempt its repair in order to mitigate his damages.
North American cannot escape the implied obligation of good faith performance
by requiring Pugh to perform in its stead. It is not reasonable to require Pugh to prove to
North American that his claim was covered. Likewise it was not reasonable to require
Pugh to remove the transmission, tear it down and perform diagnostic tests thereon when
those actions would exclude or provide North American with an argument to exclude
coverage under the contract. Finally, it was not reasonable to require Pugh to accept the
financial responsibility to perform North American's obligations under the contract.
Given the foregoing, Pugh did not unreasonably fail to mitigate his damages and should
be awarded the loss of the use of the car.
B.

Sufficient Evidence Was Before the Trial Court to Support the Award to Pugh of

the Loss of Use of His Vehicle.

North American attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award to
Pugh of the loss of use of his vehicle or, logically, to support Findings of Fact thereon
entered by the Trial Court. Because North American did not obtain a trial transcript
which would consist largely of the sworn testimony of Pugh, this Court is now incapable
of making any determination of that issue. Absent the trial transcript, Appellant's claim
of error is merely an unsupported unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve. Horton
v. Gemstate Mutual, 19A P.2d at 849. On the basis of the record submitted by North
American, it is not even, clear that the issue of proof of damages was preserved for
appeal.
North American first argues that Pugh failed to submit any evidence concerning
the damages he sustained by being deprived of the use of his car. Based on the absence
of a trial transcript, it is difficult to confirm or deny that issue. However, Finding of Fact
No. 28 demonstrates that Pugh was required to continue to make loan payments while he
was deprived of the use of his car. A transcript of his testimony would likewise include
testimony that Pugh was required to maintain full insurance coverage on the vehicle at
the insistence of his lien holder for the full year that he did not have possession of the
vehicle. The trial record would also include testimony that Pugh paid title, registration
and taxes on the vehicle while being deprived of the use thereof.
Despite the absence of a trial transcript, North American agues that Pugh
provided no evidence that he would have driven the vehicle if he had not been deprived
of the use thereof. That is the successful defense which was mounted by the defendant in
Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., supra. Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court again
belie that contention. Finding of Fact No. 26 reflects that Pugh drove his vehicle

approximately 24,000 during the 18 months prior to the breakdown or the equivalent of
more than 15,750 miles per year (R-149). The Trial Court also found that Pugh likely
would not have used the vehicle for approximately 3 months out of the year while he
drove his pick-up which is equipped for snow removal. Finding of Fact No. 24 (R-149).
The Trial Court, accordingly, diminished Pugh's award for loss of use of vehicle by that
3-month period.
Finally, North American makes the argument that Pugh would not have driven his
car, if he had not been deprived of the use thereof, because he had access to a company
truck. This argument is completely unpersuasive because Pugh drove his vehicle
approximately 24,000 in the 18 months preceding the breakdown, even though he had
access to the company vehicle at that time as well. The Findings of Fact drafted by the
Court are adequate to show that Pugh would have driven his car daily for at least 9
months out of the year that he was deprived of the use thereof.
POINT IV.

NORTH AMERICAN CANNOT CHALLENGE THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT
PROVIDING A TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE.

The standard of review applicable to attacks on the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
is the "clearly erroneous" standard under which broad deference is accorded to the trial
court State v. Pena at 935. In recognition of that broad discretion accorded to the Trial
Court, Appellant's must marshall all the evidence in order to challenge a finding of fact.
In order to challenge the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, appellant must first
marshall the evidence which supports the finding and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, they are clearly erroneous. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744,
747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In order to marshall evidence, the appellant must first
recite all the evidence supporting the challenged findings and then demonstrate
that the marshalled evidence is legally insufficient to support those findings when
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viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the decision.
Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 131, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In light of the fact that North American failed to obtain a trial transcript, it is
impossible for North American to marshall the evidence in order to mount a successful
challenge against the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. Moreover, North American fails to
make any effort to marshall facts which support Findings of Fact 6, 20 and 21 which it
challenges. Rather, North American limits it analysis to evidence which it alleges is
contrary to the facts. "When Appellant attacks the evidence, we begin our analysis with
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, not with an appellant's view of the way the trial court
should have found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). Based on the
foregoing, this Court should reject North American's challenge to the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact.
POINT V.

PUGH SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL AS WELL AS AT TRIAL.

The Trial Court awarded Pugh his attorney's fees as consequential damages under
his Vehicle Service Contact with North American Warranty. If Pugh prevails or
substantially prevails on appeal, he should also be awarded attorney's fees incurred on
appeal. In 1980 the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule of law that "a provision for
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Management Services v. Development
Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). Since then, the rule of law which permits
recovery of contract-based attorney's fees appeal has been extended to domestic litigants,
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,
1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic

action to the party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to
that party on appeal); to mechanic's lien claimants Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514,
518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ( Attorney's fees on appeal awarded on basis of underlying
award of fees on mechanic's lien statute); to attorney's fees awarded for bad faith Utah
Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (
Attorney's fees on finding of bad faith under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 are also
recoverable by prevailing party on appeal).
To the extent that Pugh prevails or substantially prevails on the appeal of the
present case, he should also be awarded his attorney's fees on appeal. If the fees awarded
by the Trial Court were foreseeable consequential damages arising from North
American's breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance, then fees incurred
by Pugh successfully defending this appeal must also be foreseeable consequential
damages. Accordingly, if Pugh prevails or substantially prevails on the present appeal,
he respectfully requests that the Court remand the matter to the Trial Court with
instructions to make a determination of Pugh's costs and attorney's fees incurred on
appeal and to award the same to him as an element of his consequential damages.
CONCLUSION
Pugh respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Trial Court's award of
attorney's fees in the sum of $6,426.00 and the award for loss of use of vehicle in the sum
of $6,750.00 and for other miscellaneous items included in the judgment, but not
challenged on appeal in the sum of $466.50. Additionally, Pugh requests that this Court
award him reasonably incurred costs and attorney's fees on appeal in an amount to be
determined by the Trial Court on remand.

Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1999.
PETERSON REED L.L.C.
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UT ST § 31A-1-301, D e f i n i t i o n s
Utah Code § 31 A-l-301
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PROVISIONS
PART HI. DEFINITIONS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31 A-l-301. Definitions
As used in this title, unless otherwise specified:
(0.5) "Administrator" is defined in Subsection
(77).
(1) "Adult" means a natural person who has
attained the age of at least 18 years.
(2) "Affiliate" means any person who controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with,
another person. A corporation is an affiliate of
another corporation, regardless of ownership, if
substantially the same group of natural persons
manages the corporations.
(3) "Alien insurer" means an insurer domiciled
outside the United States.
(4) "Annuities" means all agreements to make
periodical payments for a period certain or over
the lifetime of one or more natural persons if the
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making or continuance of all or some of the series
of the payments, or the amount of the payment, is
dependent upon the continuance of human life.
(5) "Articles" or "articles of incorporation"
means the original articles, special laws, charters,
amendments, restated articles, articles of merger
or consolidation, trust instruments, and other
constitutive documents for trusts and other
entities that are not corporations, and amendments
to any of these. Refer also to "bylaws" in this
section and Section 31A-5-203.
(6) "Bail bond insurance" means a guarantee
that a person will attend court when requiied, or
will obey the orders or judgment of the couit, as a
condition to the release of that person from
confinement.
(7) "Binder" is defined in Section 31A-21-102.
(8) "Board," "board of trustees," or "board of
directors" means the group of persons with
responsibility over, or management of, a
corporation, however designated. Refer also to
"trustee" in this section.
(9) "Business of insurance" is defined in
Subsection (44).
(10) "Business plan" means the infonnation
required to be supplied to the commissioner under
Subsections 31A-5-204(2)(i) and (j), including
the information required when these subsections
are applicable by reference under Section
31A-7-201, Section 31A-8-205, or Subsection
31A-9-205(2).
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insurer, policyholder, or a claimant under an
insurance policy. Refer also to Section
31A-26-102.

(b) property in transit over water by means other
than boat or ship;
(c) bailee liability;
(d) fixed transportation property such as
bridges, electric transmission systems, radio and
television transmission towers and tunnels; and
(e) personal and commercial property floaters.
(39) "Insolvency" means that:
(a) an insurer is unable to pay its debts or meet
its obligations as they mature;
(b) an insurer's total adjusted capital is less than
the insurer's mandatory control level RBC under
Subsection 31 A-17-601(7)(c); or
(c) an insurer is determined to be hazardous
under this title.
(40) "Insurance" means any arrangement,
contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks
from one or more persons to one or more other
persons, or any arrangement, contract, or plan for
the distribution of a risk or risks among a group of
persons that includes the person seeking to
distribute his risk. "Insurance" includes:
(a) risk distributing arrangements providing for
compensation or replacement for damages or loss
through the provision of services or benefits in
kind;
(b) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered
into by the guarantor or surety as a business and
not as merely incidental to a business transaction;
and
(c) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the
person who makes the arrangements, but with a
class of persons who have agreed to share it.
(41) "Insurance adjuster" means a person who
directs the investigation, negotiation, or settlement
of a claim under an insurance policy other than
life insurance or an annuity, on behalf of an
Copyright (c) West Group 1998
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(41.5) "Interinsurance exchange" is defined in
Subsection (69).
(42) "Insurance agent" or "agent" means a
person who represents insurers in soliciting,
negotiating, or placing insurance.
Refer to
Subsection 31A-23-102 (2) for exceptions to this
definition.
(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a
person who acts in procuring insurance on behalf
of an applicant for insurance or an insured, and
does not act on behalf of the insurer except by
collecting premiums or performing other
ministerial acts. Refer to Subsection 31A-23-102
(2) for exceptions to this definition.
(44) "Insurance business" or "business of
insurance" includes:
*8689 (a) providing health care insurance, as
defined in Subsection (35), by organizations that
are or should be licensed under this title;
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event
of contingencies not within the control of the
employees, in which the employees are entitled to
the benefits as a right, which benefits may be
provided either by single employers or by multiple
employer groups through trusts, associations, or
other entities;
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in
return for gifts, except those provided by persons
specified in Subsections 31 A-22-1305(2) and (3);
(d) providing the characteristic services of motor
clubs as outlined in Subsection (56);
(e) providing other persons with insurance as
defined in Subsection (40);
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or
proposing to make as insurer, guarantor, or surety,
any contract or policy of title insurance;
laim to original U.S. Govt, works
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(g) transacting or proposing to transact any
phase of title insurance, including solicitation,
negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of
a contract of title insurance, insuring, and
transacting matters subsequent to the execution of
the contract and arising out of it, including
reinsurance; and
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in
substance equivalent to Subsections (44)(a)
through (g) in a manner designed to evade the
provisions of this title.
(45) "Insurance consultant" or "consultant"
means a person who advises other persons about
insurance needs and coverages, is compensated by
the person advised on a basis not directly related
to the insurance placed, and is not compensated
directly or indirectly by an insurer, agent, or
broker for advice given. Refer to Subsection
31A-23-102 (2) for exceptions to this definition.
(46) "Insurance holding company system" means
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a group of two or more affiliated persons, at least
one of whom is an insurer.
(47) "Insured" means a person to whom or for
whose benefit an insurer makes a promise in an
insurance policy. The term includes policyholders,
subscribers, members, and beneficiaries. This
definition applies only to the provisions of this
title and does not define the meaning of this word
as used in insurance policies or certificates.
(48) (a) "Insurer" means any person doing an
insurance business as a principal, including
fraternal benefit societies, issuers of gift annuities
other than those specified in Subsections
31A-22-1305(2) and (3), motor clubs, employee
welfare plans, and any person purporting or
intending to do an insurance business as a
principal on his own account. It does not include a
governmental entity, as defined in Section
63-30-2, to the extent it is engaged in the
activities described in Section 31A-12-107.
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(51) "License" means the authorization issued
by the insurance commissioner under this title to
engage in some activity that is part of or related to
die insurance business. It includes certificates of
authority issued to insurers.
(52) "Life insurance" means insurance on human
lives and insurances pertaining to or connected
with human life. The business of life insurance
includes granting annuity benefits, granting
endowment benefits, granting additional benefits
in die event of death by accident or accidental
means, granting additional benefits in the event of
the total and permanent disability of the insured,
and providing optional methods of settlement of
proceeds.
(53) "Medical malpractice insurance" means
insurance against legal liability incident to the
practice and provision of medical services other
than the practice and provision of dental services.
(54) "Member" means a person having
membership rights in an insurance corporation.
Refer also to "insured" in Subsection (47).
(55) "Minimum capital" or "minimum required
capital" means the capital that must be constantly
maintained by a stock insurance corporation as
required by statute. Refer also to "permanent
surplus" under Subsection (76)(a) and Sections
31A-5-211,31A-8-209, and 31A-9-209.
(56) "Motor club" means a person licensed
under Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual
Insurance Corporations, Chapter 11, Motor

Clubs, or Chapter 14, Foreign Insurers, that
promises for an advance consideration to provide
legal
services
under
Subsection
31A-ll-102(l)(b), bail services under Subsection
31A-ll-102(l)(c), trip reimbursement, towing
services, emergency road services, stolen
automobile services, a combination of these
services, or any other services given in
Subsections 31A-ll-102(l)(b) through (f) for a
stated period of time.
(57) "Mutual"
corporation.

means

mutual

insurance

(57.5) "Nonparticipating" means a plan of
insurance under which the insured is not entitled
to receive dividends representing shares of the
surplus of the insurer.
(58) "Ocean marine insurance" means insurance
against loss of or damage to:
(a) ships or hulls of ships;
(b) goods,freight,cargoes, merchandise, effects,
disbursements, profits, moneys, securities, choses
in action, evidences of debt, valuable papers,
bottomry, respondentia interests, or other cargoes
in or awaiting transit over the oceans or inland
waterways;
(c) earnings such as freight, passage money,
commissions, or profits derived from transporting
goods or people upon or across the oceans or
inland waterways; or
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-101
(3)(a) "Service contract" means a contract or
agreement for the repair or maintenance of goods
or property, for their operational or structural
failure due to a defect in materials, workmanship,
or normal wear and tear, with or without
additional provision for incidental payment of
indemnity under limited circumstances.

f

WEST S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(b) "Service contract" does not include
mechanical breakdown insurance as defined in
Subsection (1).

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

(4) "Service contract holder" or "contract
holder" means a person who purchases a service
contract.

§ 31A-6a-101. Definitions
(1) "Mechanical Breakdown Insurance" means a
policy, contract, or agreement issued by an
insurance company that has complied with either
Title 31 A, Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual
Insurance Corporations, or Title 31 A, Chapter 14,
Foreign Insurers, that undertakes to perform or
provide repair or replacement service on goods or
property, or indemnification for repair or
replacement service, for the operational or
structural failure of the goods or property due to a
defect in materials, workmanship, or normal wear
and tear.
(2)
"Nonmanufacturers'
parts"
means
replacement parts not made for or by the original
manufacturer of the goods commonly referred to
as "after market parts."
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(5) "Service contract provider" means a person
who issues, makes, provides, administers, sells or
offers to sell a service contract, or who is
contractually obligated to provide service under a
service contract.
(6) "Service contract reimbursement policy" or
"reimbursement insurance policy" means a policy
of insurance providing coverage for all obligations
and liabilities incurred by the service contract
provider under the terms of the service contract
issued by the provider.
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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development of more economical and effective
ways of providing services under service
contracts, while placing the risk of innovation on
the service contract providers rather than on
consumers; and

Utah Code §31A-6a-102
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS

(c) permit and encourage fair and effective
competition among different systems of providing
and paying for these services.

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(2) Service contracts may not be issued, sold, or
offered for sale in this state unless the provider
has complied with this chapter. Subsections
31A-l-103(3)(i), (j), and (k) limit the application
of this chapter to certain persons engaged in a
limited manner in providing extended warranties
or service contracts.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31A-6a-102. Scope and purposes
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to:
(a) create a legal framework within which
service contracts may be sold in this state;
(b) encourage innovation in the marketing and
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As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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filing fee as required under Subsection
31A-3-103, or the filing shall be rejected.

Utah Code § 31 A-6a-103
W E S T S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS

(c) Persons complying with this chapter are not
required
to
comply
with
Subsections
31A-21-201(1) and 31A-23-302 (3), or Chapter
19, Rate Regulation.

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(3)(a) Premiums collected on service contracts
are not subject to premium taxes.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31A-6a-103. Requirements for doing
business
(1) Service contracts may not be issued, sold, or
offered for sale in this state unless the service
contract is insured under a service contract
reimbursement insurance policy issued by an
insurer authorized to do business in this state, or a
recognized surplus lines carrier.
(2)(a) Service contracts may not be issued, sold,
or offered for sale unless a true and correct copy
of the service contract and the provider's
reimbursement insurance policy have been filed
with the commissioner. Copies of contracts and
policies must be filed no less than 30 days prior to
the issuance, sale offering for sale, or use of the
service contract or reimbursement insurance
policy in this state.

Page 1

(b) Premiums collected by issuers of
reimbursement insurance policies are subject to
premium taxes.
(4) Persons marketing, selling, or offering to sell
service contracts for service contract providers
that comply with this chapter are exempt from the
licensing requirements of this title.
(5) Service contract providers complying with
this chapter are not required to compl} with
Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual Insurance
Corporations, Chapter 7, Nonprofit Health
Service Insurance Corporations, Chapter 8, Health
Maintenance Organizations and Limited Health
Plans, Chapter 9, Insurance Fraternals, Chapter
10, Annuities, Chapter 11, Motor Clubs, Chapter
12, State Risk Management Fund, Chapter 13,
Employee Welfare Funds and Plans, Chapter 14,
Foreign Insurers, Chapter 19, Rate Regulation,
Chapter 25, Third Party Administrators, and
Chapter 28, Guaranty Associations.
*8893

(b) Each modification of the terms of any
service contract or reimbursement insurance
policy must also be filed 30 days prior to its use in
this state. Each filing must be accompanied by a
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As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah J 992.
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is to be paid.

Utah Code §31A-6a-104

(5) If prior approval of repair work is required,
the contract must conspicuously state the
procedure for obtaining prior approval and for
making a claim, including a toll free telephone
number for claim service and a procedure for
obtaining reimbursement for emergency repairs
performed outside of normal business hours

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(6) The contract must conspicuously state the
existence of any deductible amount.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31A-6a-104. Required disclosures
(1) All service contract reimbursement insurance
policies insuring service contracts issued, sold, or
offered for sale in this state must conspicuously
state that, upon failure of the provider to perform
under the contract, the issuer of the policy shall
pay on behalf of the provider any sums the
provider is legally obligated to pay or shall
provide the service which the provider is legally
obligated to perform, according to the provider's
contractual obligations under the service contracts
issued or sold by the provider.
(2) A service contract may not be issued, sold,
or offered for sale in this state unless the contract
contains a statement in substantially the following
form, "Obligations of the provider under this
service contract are guaranteed under a service
contract reimbursement insurance policy. Should
the provider fail to pay or provide service on any
claim within 60 days after proof of loss has been
filed, the contract holder is entitled to make a
claim directly against the Insurance Company."
The contract shall also conspicuously state the
name and address and a toll free claims service
telephone number of the insurer.
(3) The contract must identify the provider, the
seller, and the service contract holder.

(7) The contract must specify the merchandise,
services to be provided and any limitations,
exceptions, or exclusions.
Any preexisting
conditions clause must specifically state which
preexisting conditions are excluded from
coverage.
(8) The contract must state the conditions upon
which the use of nonmanufacturers1 parts will be
allowed. Conditions stated must comply with
applicable state and federal laws.
*8895 (9) The contract must state any terms,
restrictions, or conditions governing the
transferability of the service contract.
(10) The contract must state the terms,
restrictions, or conditions governing cancellation
of the contract by either the contract holder or
provider, and must satisfy the provisions of
Sections 31A-21-303 through 31A-21-305.
(11) A service contract or reimbursement
insurance policy may not be issued, sold, or
offered for sale in this state unless the contract
contains a statement in substantially the following
form, "Coverage afforded under this contract is
not guaranteed by the Property and Casualty
Guaranty Association."
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992.

(4) The contract must conspicuously state the
total purchase price and the terms under which it
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acts

Utah Code § 31A-6a-105

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31A-6a-105. Prohibited acts
(1) Except as provided in Subsection
31A-6a-104(2), a service contract provider may
not use in its name, contracts, or literature:

Page 1

insurance, casualty, or surety business; or
(b) a name deceptively similar to the name or
description of any insurance or surety corporation,
or any other service contract provider.
(2) A service contract provider or his
representative may not make, permit, or cause to
be made any false or misleading statement, or
deliberately omit any material statement that
would be considered misleading if omitted, in
connection with the sale, offer to sell, or
advertisement of a service contract.
(3) A bank, savings and loan association,
insurance company, or other lending institution
may not require the purchase of a service contract
as a condition of a loan.
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992.

(a) any of the words insurance, casualty, surety,
mutual, or any other words descriptive of the
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(u) the name and address of each service
contract holder, and

Utah Code § 31A-6a-106
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS

(in) claims files
(c) Service contract providers shall retain all
records pertaining to each service contract nolder
for at least three years after the specified pei lod of
coverage has expired

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§

31A-6a-106.
requirements

Page 1

Recordkeeping

(l)(a) All service contract providers shall keep
accurate accounts, books, and records concerning
transactions regulated under this chapter
(b) A service contract provider's accounts,
books, and records shall include

(2) A provider discontinuing bus mess in dns
state shall mamtam its records until it furnishes
the commissioner satisfactory proof that it has
discharged all obligations to contract holders in
this state
(3) Service contract providers shall make all
accounts, books, and records concerning
transactions regulated under this chapter oi other
pertinent chapters available to the commissioner
for the purpose of examination as provided in
Sections 31A-2-203 and 31A-2-204
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992

(1) copies of all service contracts issued,
Search this disc for cases citmg this section
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-107
The issuer of a reimbursement insurance policy
may not cancel the policy until a notice of
cancellation in accordance with Section
31A-21-303, 31A-21-304, or 31A-21-305 has
been mailed or delivered to the commissioner and
to each insured provider. The cancellation of a
reimbursement policy may not reduce the issuer's
responsibility for service contracts issued by
providers prior to the date of the cancellation.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

Added by Laws 1992, c. 203. Amended by Laws l997, c.
10, § 37, eff. May 5, 1997.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§

31A-6a-107.
Cancellation
reimbursement insurance
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reimbursement insurance issuers

Utah Code § 31 A-6a-108

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS

Providers under this chapter are considered to be
the agent of the issuer of die reimbursement
insurance for purposes of Section 31A-23-311 In
cases where a provider is acting as an
administrator and enlists other provider^, the
provider actmg as the administrator shall notify
die issuer of the reimbursement insurance of die
other providers

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

As enacted by Chapter 203 Laws of Utah 1992

Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§

31A-6a-108.
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Utah Code § 31 A-6a-109
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc* is provided subsequently in
this document)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 31A-6a-109. Enforcement provisions
Anyone violating any of the provisions of this
chapter or any rule made pursuant to the grant of
rulemaking authority under this title may be
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assessed an administrative forfeiture equal to two
times the amount of any profit gained from the
violation. In addition an administrative forfeiture
may be assessed for each violation not to exceed
$1,000 per violation.
If the violations are
continuing, or are of a serious nature, or a person's
business practices in connection with the
solicitation, sale, offering for sale, or performance
under a service contract subject to this chapter,
constitute a danger to the legitimate interests of
consumers or the public, the commissioner may
enjoin the person from soliciting, selling, or
offering to sell service contracts in this state either
permanently or for a stated period of time.
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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UtahCode§31A-6a-110

m the enforcement of this chapter

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE
CONTRACTS

(2) The commissioner may by rule or order, after
a hearmg, exempt certam service contract
providers or service contract providers for a
specific class of service contracts that are not
otherwise exempt under Subsections 31A-1-103
(3)(0, OX or (k), from any provision of this title
The commissioner may order substitute
requirements on a finding that a particular
provision of this title is not necessary for the
protection of the public or that the substitute
requirement is reasonably certam to provide
equivalent protection to the public

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§ 31A-6a-110. Rulemaking
(1) Pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative
Rulemaking
Act,
the
commissioner may make rules necessary to assist
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As enacted by Chapter 203 Laws of Utah 1992
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RCP Rule 15, RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
*35 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15
W E S T S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART ffl. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS,
AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98
RULE
15.
AMENDED
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

AND

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a
party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the
court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the

Pagel

pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of
the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever
the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions
or occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. Permission may be granted even
though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the
court deems it advisable that the adverse party
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID PUGH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 970006006 CV
Judge Robert K. Hilder

vs.
NORTH AMERICAN WARRANTY
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant,

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder on June 25,
1998. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Kendall S. Peterson. Defendant was
represented by counsel Robert W. Hughes. The Court, having considered the Statement of
Stipulated Facts entered into between the parties including the exhibits contained therein, having

heard the testimony of witnesses called at trial and the oral argument of counsel and having
previously entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff David
Pugh is granted judgment against North American Warranty Services Inc. for the following
items:
Towing
Emergency travel
Remaining repair expense
Loss of use of vehicle
Attorneys fees
Court costs
Minus (Deductible)

$

50.00
135.00
225.00
6,750.00
6,426.00
106.50
- 50.00
$13,642.50

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this judgment
shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.

c:\wp5.1\ksp\pugh\JUDGMENT

2

